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F acuity tenure, whether viewed as a momentous decision of million-
dollar proportions or as a relatively routine matter of academic free-
dom, has been the subject of continuing concern and controversy in
American higher education.' Problems in this area, including the lack of
definitive standards for evaluating tenure candidates, have been high-
lighted by the recent downturn in the economy and the resultant decline
in both enrollment and employment in colleges and universities.'
This trend is actively demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in Mayberry v. Dees.3 The plaintiff was an assistant profes-
sor-of romance languages at a public university. At the end of his fourth
year in this position, his department chairman concluded: "If reduction in
staff is forced upon us, [I] would hesitate to give him tenure. Otherwise,
[I] would not object." In the plaintiffs fifth year, during which the uni-
versity's "up or out" review was customarily conducted, his personality
problems with several colleagues, particularly the department chairman,
came to a head.5 The need to reduce the number of faculty members pro-
* Perry A. Zirkel (Ph.D. and J.D., University of Connecticut; LL.M. Yale University) is
university professor (and former dean) of education at Lehigh University.
' See generally FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION
ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973); ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (L. Joughin ed. 1967).
See e.g., Freeman, The Job Market for College Faculty, in ACADEMIC REWARDS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 76-77 (D. Lewis & W. Becker eds. 1979).
663 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982).
' Id. at 506.
' For example, one of his departmental colleagues had evaluated him earlier as "adoles-
cent in his insistence on 'my personal freedom.'" Id. He had a continuing conflict with the
department chairman about the use of English in Spanish classes. Id. at 505 n.13. During
his fifth probationary year, he expressed his complaints to and solicited criticism from de-
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ficient in Spanish, due to declining enrollment, also came to the fore.'
The department chairman recommended, and the university's chancellor
decided, to deny tenure to Mayberry." In sustaining the university's deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit cited and extensively relied on the report of the
Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, commonly re-
ferred to as the Keast Commission.8 Explaining the standards for tenure,
the court enumerated four criteria which were taken into account: schol-
arship; teaching; service; and "developing collegiality-the capacity to re-
late well and constructively to the comparatively small bank of scholars
on whom the ultimate fate of the university rests." Accepting the una-
voidable subjectivity of this fourth criterion and invoking a judicial pos-
ture of abstention or deference to academic decisions,10 the court con-
cluded that "Mayberry's case . ..must be decided against him."'"
This Article advocates and proposes a more exacting judicial review of
faculty tenure cases that are based on collegiality or other such personal-
ity criteria. Initially, the operational context of faculty tenure cases will
be reviewed. Next, an overview of the legal context for such cases, includ-
ing the linked concepts of academic freedom and judicial abstention will
be provided. Part III will present a summary analysis of the case law to
date. Finally, Part IV will propose an approach to be utilized in place of
that applied by the Mayberry court.
I. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF FACULTY TENURE CASES
In practice, there are important distinctions between nontenured and
tenured faculty, and between contract nonrenewal and termination, that
help to place the denial or conferral of tenure in perspective. Typically,
tenure is awarded after successful completion of a probationary period.
Nonrenewal occurs only at the expiration of the contract and thus applies
solely to nontenured faculty. The procedural due process requirements of
nonrenewal generally are minimal, often limited to timely notice. More-
partmental colleagues concerning the chairman's self-appointment to the department's self-
study committee. Id. at 507-08.
6 Id. at 509 n.19.
7 The evaluations by Mayberry's senior colleagues were mixed. Id. at 506.
The Commission derives its name from its co-chairman. See generally FACULTY TEN-
URE, supra note 1.
9 663 F.2d at 514. Although it referred to the university's faculty manual which speci-
fied "constructive relationship with colleagues" as a criterion for tenure, the court gave the
impression of generalization beyond the defendant-university by 1) meshing this criterion
into its summary of the Keast Commission's report and recommendations (including a sub-
sequent "in general" reference to "uncollegial"); 2) citing court cases beyond the institution
and its policies; and 3) specifically referring to a page in the Keast Commission report
which, upon closer examination, is part of an independent contribution which provides only
indirect support at best. Id. at 514 n.26.
10 Id. at 519 n.38, 520 n.42.
Id. at 520.
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over, minimal explanation for nonrenewal is required. In contrast, termi-
nation applies to both tenured and nontenured faculty and requires
greater procedural protection, including specific and circumscribed rea-
sons for dismissal. These justifications are primarily limited to personal
causes, such as incompetency or insubordination, and impersonal causes,
such as financial exigency or program discontinuance. Additionally, ter-
mination occurs during, as opposed to the end of, the contractual term.
Thus, termination may be imposed within limited periods for nontenured
faculty and at virtually any time (until retirement or resignation) for ten-
ured faculty."2
The actions of nonrenewal and termination fit within a broader set of
employment decisions that, stated adversely, form a continuum of con-
flict between faculty members and institutions of higher education. Gen-
erally, this continuum may be portrayed in a direct chronological and in-
verse hierarchical pattern. For example: 1) decision not to hire; 2) salary
or assignment dispute; 3) nonpromotion; 4) nonrenewal; 5) denial of ten-
ure; and 6) termination.2 As a result, it is apparent that denial of tenure,
the focal point of this Article, is positioned between nonrenewal and ter-
mination not only in terms of timing, but also in terms of gravity.14 More-
over, the distinctions between these levels overlap to such an extent that
denial of tenure may be perceived as a hybrid of nonrenewal and
termination.
The scope and standards of the reasons justifying the denial of tenure
are more stringent than those for routine nonrenewal and yet are less
strict then those for termination for cause. The customary criteria for de-
nying or granting tenure based on individual performance'" are research,
11 This description is deliberately simple and skeletal in order to provide an overall
framework of "generally applicable, nationwide principles." Id. at 513. It is not the author's
intention to cloud the extensive variety of institutional policies and practices nor to under-
estimate the complexity of the evolving law in such areas as fiscal exigency or program
discontinuance. The relevant literature is voluminous, with the references in note 1, Supra,
serving as a convenient starting point. See, e.g., S. STROUP, N. VAN GIESON, & P. ZIRKEL,
DEFICITS, DECLINES AND DISMISSALS: FACULTY TENURE AND FISCAL ExIGENCY (1982); Clague,
Jimenez v. Almodovar: Program Discontinuance as a Cause for Termination of Tenured
Faculty in Public Institutions, 9 EDUC. L. REP. 805 (1983).
'" An ultimate step, not discussed within the scope of this Article, is mandatory
retirement.
" Timing and gravity correlate within this continuum generally, but not perfectly. Thus,
for example, termination can occur prior to the tenure decision, however, it is generally
regarded as a more damaging decision than the denial of tenure.
Although denial of tenure is the focus of this discussion, cases from other areas are in-
cluded in this Article for a fuller perspective. As one commentator pointed out: "The gov-
erning principles vary not only with the constitutional or statutory provision involved, but
also depending on the nature of the practice and the context in which it occurs." Runyan,
Employment Decision-Making in Educational Institutions, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 955, 956
(1981).
," Similar to but less strict than termination for impersonal cause, tenure may be denied
1984-85]
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teaching, and service.'a Personality is a factor that is separate and inde-
pendent of these three criteria and is generally not, officially at least, a
major consideration in tenure decisions. 7 It should be noted, however,
that the defendant institution in Mayberry v. Dees was one of the rela-
tively few institutions which officially designated a personality factor as a
separate and significant criterion in tenure decisions.'"
II. LEGAL CONTEXT OF FACULTY TENURE CASES
A. The Primary Legal Bases
The legal bases in faculty tenure cases vary widely and include the con-
stitutional safeguards of freedom of expression, due process, equal protec-
tion, and the statutory protections guaranteed in the civil rights acts."9
The defendant institutions have prevailed in approximately eighty per-
cent of recently reported faculty employment cases, with a higher per-
centage in race and national origin discrimination and procedural due
process cases and the lowest proportion of victories (62.5 %) in the first
amendment cases.
20
Inasmuch as personality may be regarded as an intangible characteris-
tic, it becomes a concrete issue when manifested in the form of behavior.
In these cases, the issue usually involves the form of the faculty member's
purportedly protected expression or, less often, the form of the institu-
tion's allegedly discriminatory acts. Thus, specifically with regard to de-
nial-of-tenure cases involving personality factors, the two major legal ba-
ses for faculty plaintiffs are the first amendment s" and, to a lesser extent,
for constitutional reasons, such as staffing needs and resources.
1 See, e.g., Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure in Faculty Peer Review: Im-
pact of Title VII Litigation, 9 J.C. & U.L. 279, 290 (1982-83); Yurko, Judicial Recognition
of Academic Collective Interests: A New Approach to Faculty Title VII Litigation, 60
B.U.L. REV. 473, 476 (1979). The generality of this treatment is not intended to obscure the
variety and complexity of institutional practice. The formulation, measurement, and weight-
ing of these criteria and the use of additional criteria differ, for example, according to insti-
tutional type and academic field. See generally J. CENTRA, How UNIVERSITIES EVALUATE
FACULTY PERFORMANCE: A SURVEY OF DEPARTMENT HEADS (GRE Board Research Report No.
75-5bR, 1977).
,7 See, e.g., J. CENTRA, supra note 16, at 5-8. Personality factors are, of course, part of
teaching and service. Here, however, personality or its formulation as collegiality is dealt
with as a separate criterion.
i8 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Zirkel, Outcomes Analysis of Court Decisions Concerning Faculty Employ-
ment, 10 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 171, 176 (1982).
20 Id. at 176. Contrary to the prevailing perception among administrators, there was not
an overall difference in outcomes between nontenured and tenured faculty plaintiffs. Id. at
175, 181.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech." The judicially recognized right of free association, implied in the First
[Vol. 33:223
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Title VII.
The critical test for first amendment cases, derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 3 as
related to denial of tenure (D/T) can be summarized by the following
steps:
1) Plaintiff faculty member has the initial burden to show that:
a) his conduct was protected by the first amendment, ' and
b) this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the
D/T decision.
2) Burden then shifts to the defendant college or university to
show that it would have reached the same decision in the absence
of the protected conduct.25
In Pickering v. Board of Education,2 6 a first amendment decision that
clarifies the applicability of the Mr. Healthy test, the Supreme Court es-
tablished that protected conduct for a public school teacher is determined
by striking "a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees."2 Using this balancing test, the Court con-
Amendment freedoms of expression and assembly, may also be a basis for such cases. For
cases that establish the connection of academic freedom to the first amendment, see infra
note 57.
24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (also known as the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 10OOe-17 (Supp. V 1981), did not apply to educational
institutions until the 1972 amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The Title
prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex, race, or national origin.
An overlapping civil rights statute, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
prohibits sex discrimination in federally-funded programs, was held applicable to employ-
ment in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
21 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Factually, Mt. Healthy was a denial of tenure (D/T) case in a
public school context. The fact that nonrenewal in this case meant denial of tenure appar-
ently affected the Court's decision making. The Court reasoned:
The long-term consequence of an award of tenure are of great moment both to the
employee and the employer. They are too significant for us to hold that the Board
in this case would be precluded, because it considered constitutionally protected
conduct in deciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a trier of fact
that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was such that he would not
have been rehired in any event.
Id. at 286.
2 "He" and "his" are used generically for both males and females throughout this
Article.
" 429 U.S. at 287. Other relevant first amendment decisions by the Supreme Court,
which clarify the applicability of the Mt. Healthy test, include Givhan v. Western Line,
Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (nonrenewal case in public school); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (termination case in a public school); Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (nonrenwal case in a public junior college).
2' 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
"' Id. at 563.
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cluded that protected conduct includes accurate statements of public con-
cern which are not insubordinate s and erroneous public criticisms of the
employer which do not impede the teacher's classroom performance or
the school's regular operation. 29 In Perry v. Sinderrnan,30 the Court made
it clear that the Pickering public-issue protections extend to faculty
members of public institutions of higher education.3 ' In Givhan v. West-
ern Line Consolidated,32 the Court further established that this protected
conduct includes not only public but also private expression 3 and that
the second step in Mr. Healthy amounts to a "but for" test."
To the more limited extent that D/T based on personality can be
linked to discrimination (in terms of disparate treatment of protected
classes) rather than expression (in terms of unwarranted infringement of
protected conduct), Title VII is applicable. Basing D/T on sex-stereo-
typed personality traits serves as an appropriate example.3 5
The central test for Title VII disparate treatment" cases as related to
D/T and as derived from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 7 can be
summarized as follows:
1) Plaintiff faculty member has the initial burden to show that
prima facie case that:
a) he belongs to a class protected by Title VII (e.g., women or
minorities);
b) he sought and was qualified for tenure;
c) despite his qualifications he was denied tenure; and
d) after the denial of tenure, the institution sought to fill his
position with persons of similar qualifications.
38
The Court did not specifically use, much less define the term "insubordinate," but
suggested possible exclusions from protected conduct for: 1) "maintaining either discipline
by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers," and 2) maintaining "close working
relationships for which it can be persuasively claimed that personal loyalty and confidence
are necessary to . . . proper functioning." Id. at 570 and n.3; see also Connick v. Myers,
(1983)(dispute concerning internal office policy did not pass Pickering test).
2 391 U.S. at 573.
30 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
" Id. at 598.
32 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
" Id. at 413-16. The Court, however, noted that when a teacher privately confronts his
immediate superior, it is not only the content, but also the manner, time and place of his
message that must be taken into account in the Pickering balance. Id. at 415 n.4.
Id. at 410.
00 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
3 Title VII disparate impact analysis, which usually is not used in individual D/T cases,
is derived from Grzggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Note, Title VII on
Campus: Judicial Review of University Decisions, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1206, 1208-10 (1982).
37 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (re-hiring case within a private industry context).
50 It is unclear whether this fourth step applies to D/T cases because the McDonnell
Douglas test was formulated with regard to hiring decisions; in fact, the Court stated that
this formulation could differ in other factual situations. Id. at 802 n.13. Lower courts have
[Vol. 33:223
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2) Burden then shifts to the college or university to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the D/T. s8
3) Burden then shifts back to the plaintiff-faculty member to
show that the institution's stated reasons for the D/T was in fact
a pretext for discrimination."
Other relevant Supreme Court Title VII decisions which clarify the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test include: Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,4 1
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,42 and Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine.43
In Furnco, the Court ruled that once the employee establishs a prima
facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears the burden of showing a
legitimate, although not optimal, nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-
missal. The Court also held that statistics are admissible for this pur-
pose." In Sweeney, the Court further refined this burden; the defendant
is not required to prove an absence of discriminatory motive s.4 Finally, in
Burdine, the Court added that the defendant's burden is one of produc-
tion, not one of persuasion.
4 6
B. Academic Freedom and Abstention
Academic freedom, like its handmaiden faculty tenure,47 is admittedly
an evolving and somewhat amorphous concept." Nevertheless, a close ex-
tended to include this step using, for example in sex discrimination cases, the defendant
institution's subsequent tenuring of comparatively qualified men as evidence of discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg
College, 621 F.2d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 1980).
411 U.S. at 802.
Id at 804.
41 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Furnco was a hiring case in private industry.
42 439 U.S. 24 (1978). Sweeney was a nonpromotion case in higher education.
43 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Burdine was a nonpromotion and termination case involving a
state government.
" 438 U.S. at 576-77, 580.
4" 439 U.S. at 25.
4 450 U.S. at 257-58. The Court also noted that in a hiring context this intermediate
burden requires only that the defendant-employer show that the qualifications of the person
selected were equal to those of the plaintiff. A showing of superiority was not necessary, Id
at 259-60.
" See, e.g., Tucker & Mautz, Academic Freedom, Tenure and Incompetence, 63 EDUC.
REC. 22 (1982).
" See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552-53 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). The Court noted:
Hillis' attorneys, in support of their claim for additional attorney's fees claim:
"Academic freedom is an amorphous field about which a great deal has been said
in esoteric law journal articles and academic publications, but little determined in
explicit, concrete judicial opinions." This is nearer the mark [than his procedural
due process claim]. While academic freedom is well recognized . . . its perimeters
are ill-defined and the case law defining it is inconsistent.
1984-85]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
amination reveals that academic freedom has two distinct strains: institu-
tional autonomy and individual autonomy."9 The tradition of institutional
autonomy developed in response to threats of outside interference includ-
ing, in the name of academic abstention or the deference doctrine,"0 that
presented by judicial intrusions.' The tradition of individual autonomy
provides protection against outside governmental interference." 2 How-
ever, the individual autonomy strand of academic freedom, because of its
intrainstitutional quality, also provides protection against internal inter-
ference, i.e. that from the college's (or university's) administration5 3 and
from the faculty member's peers. 4 Thus, as the Yale University president
forcefully stated in 1972: "In strong universities, assuring freedom from
intellectual conformity coerced within the institution is even more of a
concern than is the protection of freedom from external interference."55
[T]he tattered secret that faculty members may devise a pattern
of departmental appointments that shuts out significant schools
of thought, may enter into a Faustian bargain with the grant-giv-
ers that trades off mental independence for a larger bank roll,
and may make political judgments when reviewing the profes-
sional merits of their peers."6
Id at 552-53 [citations omitted].
For a detailed historical overview, see R. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955). For a compilation of AAUP procedures and policy
statements, see ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 1.
" See, e.g., Note, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Pro-
posed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1538, 1546-51 (1981); Pincoffs, Intro-
duction, in THE CONCEPT OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972)(distinguishing be-
tween freedom of the academy and freedom of academics); cf. Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp.
802, 813 (E.D. Ark. 1979)("The present case is particularly difficult because it involves a
fundamental tension between the academic freedom of the individual teacher to be free
from restraints from the university administration, and the academic freedom of the univer-
sity to be free of governmental, including judicial, interference.").00 See, e.g., H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 17 (1979)("The
other side of the coin of academic abstention is institutional autonomy."); Gray, Academic
Freedom: A Symposium, 13 N.Y.U. EDUc. Q. 6, 7 (1982).
" See, e.g., H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 50, at 14-18.
62 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom: A Symposium, 13 N.Y.U. EDUC. Q. 3
(1982).
" See, e.g., Note, The Role of Academic Freedom in Defining the Employment Con-
tract, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608 (1981).
See, e.g., R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 6 (1955); Tucker & Mautz,
supra note 45, at 22-24.
Incursions upon academic freedom by one's colleagues is not theoretical or static. For
example, a comprehensive survey of social science faculty members during the McCarthy
era found that a majority of them felt that professors who were admitted Communists
should be fired. See P. LAZARSFELD & W. THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC MIND 392 (1958).
°° Brewster, On Tenure, 58 AM. ASS'N. UNIV. PROFESSORS BULL. 381, 382 (1972)(emphasis
in original).
I" Metzger, Academic Freedom: A Symposium, 13 N.Y.U. EDUC. Q. 4, 5 (1982)(emphasis
[Vol. 33:223
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Judicial support for academic freedom has developed through a long line
of Supreme Court decisions." The core concept, as decisively expressed
by a unanimous Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents58 and as re-
peated by the lead opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,"0 is the protection of "the robust exchange of ideas.""0 Threats to
the robust exchange of ideas come from fellow faculty members as well as
administrators and outsiders."1
This Pogo-like 2 overlap between the individual and institutional
strands of academic freedom is further evidenced by the judicial demar-
cation of faculty authority. Frankfurter's oft-cited63 quotation in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire:" "'[T]he four essential freedoms' of the univer-
sity-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study' "" is strikingly similar to the controlling contours of faculty au-
thority demarcated in NLRB v. Yeshiva University," in which faculty
members were held to be managers and, thus, were not covered by the
NLRA.6
7
III. RELEVANT CASE LAW
Evidence of personality or collegiality is not subject to precise measure-
ment because personality itself is intangible; it is seen only indirectly in
the form of behavior and its infringement. Moreover, due to the protected
added).
5' See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 812-13 (1978)(Powell, J.,
concurring); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 263 (1957); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)(Frankfurter, and Douglas, J.J., concurring); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1952)(Douglas, J., concurring).
11 385 U.S. at 603.
59 438 U.S. at 313 (Powell, J., concurring).
60 Id.
"' See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
12 "We has met the enemy, and it is us." W. KELLY POGO (1951).
" See, e.g., Regents of Univ. California v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)(Powell, J.,
concurring).
0, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)(quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN
SOUTH AFRICA 10-12).
00 Id.
00 444 U.S. 672, 686 n.23 (1980).
67 One author has predicted that this overlap will lead to claims of institutional aca-
demic freedom by faculty members. Note, supra note 49, at 1547 n.63. This protection
against outside intrusion, however, would seem superfluous in light of the more firmly en-
trenched scope of individual academic freedom. Id. at 1546. In fact, this overlap points to
the threat of faculty authority exercised in the area of employment decisions; the danger
arises from the fact that determinations are made by less than the entire faculty, such as
intradepartmental tenure committees. See Gray, Confidentiality of Faculty Peer Review, 11
EDuc L. REP. 11 (1983).
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status of expression and discrimination, it is often covert. As a result of
the imprecise and indirect evidence of personality, its frequency and
treatment in the case requires a broad net. When thus viewed broadly,
examples of judicial review of faculty employment decisions that are
based, at least in part, on collegiality or other such personality factors are
more common than one might expect. Although partially, and then only
peripherally, covered in articles addressed to the first amendment 8 and
Title V11 69 rights of faculty members, the faculty employment cases rest-
ing on personality factors have not been compiled, must less analyzed,
elsewhere. One method of illustrating their scope and direction is to tabu-
late the frequency and outcome of the decisions which address these is-
sues. Table I (below) presents such a numerical compilation, grouping
cases according to courts' reliance on the first amendment, Title VII , and
"other" legal bases, such as procedural due process or state law.7 Cases
are further categorized in terms of the outcome for the plaintiff-faculty
member as follows: "+" = decision for; "-" = decision against; and
"Inc." = inconclusive decision. Decisions categorized as inconclusive were
those involving a preliminary ruling, such as denial of defendant's motion
for summary judgment, or an appellate remand.7' The aforementioned
"s See, e.g., Hodges, Postsecondary Faculty Members' Rights of Free Speech, 9 J.C. &
U.L. 85 (1982-83).
69 See, e.g., Note, supra note 36.
" Since there were often multiple legal bases offered within a given case, the decisions
are classified according to what appears to be the primary rationale. The only case tabulated
according to two classifications, because both rationales seemed to be equally important,
was Hill v. Nettleton, 455 F. Supp. 514 (D. Colo. 1978). Here the first amendment and Title
VII are categories used generically and include expression or discrimination decisions rely-
ing on other grounds. See, e.g., Van de Vate v. Boling, 379 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1974);
Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339 N.E.2d 880, 377 N.Y.S.2d
471 (1975).
Other sources of approximation included:
1) the inclusion of four cases involving plaintiffs who were only partially or pe-
ripherally faculty members. See, e.g., Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d
829 (5th Cir. 1972)(teaching assistant); Lux v. Board of Regents, 95 N.M. 361, 622
P.2d 266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981)(assistant dean).
2) the inclusion, by analogy, of several cases into the closest step of the opera-
tional continuum. See, e.g., Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1982)(retirement categorized as termination); Adams v. Lake City Com-
munity College, 404 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1981)(written reprimand case placed in
salary/assignment category).
3) the allocation of the few partial outcome, non-remand cases into "+" or .
category. See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553 (5th
Cir. 1982)(upholding judgment but modifying liability award, thereby categorized
as "+").
4) the designation of "inconclusive" decisions. See infra note 71.
5) the classification of multi-level employment decisions. See infra note 72.
7 All of the judgments except those issued by the Supreme Court are technically incon-
clusive with respect to possible future judicial determinations. However, only those deci-
sions specifically reserved or remanded for further judicial review were categorized as incon-
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continuum of employment decisions72 supplied the remaining subclassifi-
cation dimensions.
73
TABLE 1: Outcome of Faculty Employment Cases Involving Personality
Factors"'
Amendment I Title VII Other Totals
+ - Inc. + - Inc. + - Inc. + - Inc.
Hiring 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
Salary 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1
Nonpromotion 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Nonrenewal 9 14 7 2 2 0 0 0 0 11 16 7
D/T 3 53 0 54 0 10 3 117
Termination 5 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 6 10 3
TOTALS 17 31 16 4 10 4 0 3 0 21 44 20
(%) (35) (65) (29) (71) (0) (100) (32) (68)
n 64 18 3 85
A review of Table I reveals that approximately eighty-five faculty em-
elusive here.
" See supra text accompanying note 13.
" When more than one level of employment infringement was claimed, the most severe
was used for classification purposes.
11 The court decisions are listed below by coded designations to correspond to the row-
by-row cells of the Table: I - Amendment I; VII = Title VII; 0 = Other; H= hiring; $ =
salary; NP = nonpromotion; NR - nonrenewal; D/T - denial of tenure; T = termination;
+ = judgment for plaintiff; = judgement for college or university; and Inc. =
inconclusive.
I/H/-: Ollman v. Toll, 704 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978).
1/$/-: Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Berry v. Battey, 666 F.2d 1183
(8th Cir. 1981).
I/S/Inc.: Allaire v. Rogers, 658 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1981).
I/NP/Inc: Kim v. Coppin State College, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981); Goolsby v. Regents,
234 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. App. 1977).
I/NR/+: Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1982); Lindsey v. Board of Regents,
607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979); Goss v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979);
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (1974); Hickingbottom v. Easley, 494 F. Supp. 980 (E.D.
Ark. 1978); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Hill v. Nettleton, 455 F.
Supp. 514 (D. Colo. 1978); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del.
1977); Ofsevit v. Trustees, 582 P.2d 88 (Cal. 1978).
I/NR/-: Montgomery v. Boshears, 698 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1983); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin
State Univ., 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Roseman v. Indiana
Univ., 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Cotten v. Board of
Regents, 515 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975); Bradford v. Tarrant County Jr. College Dist., 492
F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1974); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1075 (1973); Poddar v. Youngstown State Univ., 480 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1973); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Jones v. Hopper,
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ployment cases involving personality factors have been decided since
410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969); Landrum v. Sourthern Kentucky Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241
(E.D. Ky. 1984); Marwil v. Baker, 499 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Carr v. Board of
Trustees, 645 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Cherry v. Burnett, 444 F. Supp. 324 (D. Md.
1977); Lux v. Board of Regents, 95 N.M. 361, 622 P.2d 266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
I/NR/Inc: McDonough v. Trustees of Univ. System of New Hampshire, 704 F.2d 780 (1st
Cir. 1983); Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1982); Eichman v. Indiana State Univ.,
597 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1977); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaprelian v.
Texas Women's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1976); Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th
Cir. 1972); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
I/DT/+: Stern v. Shouldice, 706 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 487
(1984); United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
I/DT/-: Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct 69 (1982);
Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 662 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910
(1982); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Watts v. Board of Cura-
tors, 495 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1974); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264
(M.D. Pa 1976).
I/DT/Inc: Seizer v. Fleisher, 629 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981);
Haimowitz v. University of Nevada, 579 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1978); Scagnelli v. Whiting, 554
F. Supp. 77 (M.D.N.C. 1982).
I/T/+: D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975); Phillips v. Puryears, 403 F. Supp.
80 (W.D. Va. 1975); Texton v. Hancock, 359 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1978); Endress v. Brook-
dale Community College, 364 A.2d 1080 (N.J. App. 1976).
I/T/-: Smith v. Kent State Univ., 696 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1983); Dewey v. University of
New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 669 F.2d 142 (3d
Cir. 1982); Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1981); Adamian v. Lombard, 608 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Shaw v. Board of Trustees, 549 F.2d
929 (4th Cir. 1976); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Jordan v. Board of
Reports, 583 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
I/T/Inc: Heath v. Cleary, 798 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1983); Trotman v. Board of Trustees,
635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109
(9th Cir. 1975).
VII/H/-: Van de Vate v. Boling, 379 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
VII/NP/+: Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1045 (1980).
VII/NP/-: Cussler v. University of Maryland, 430 F. Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977).
VII/NR/+: Lincoln v. Board of Trustees, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1982); Hill v. Nettleton,
455 F. Supp. 514 (D. Colo. 1978).
VII/NR/-: United States v. University of Maryland, 438 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1977); Pe-
ters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
VII/DT/-: Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. University of No.
Carolina, 632 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1977); Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 577 F.2d 1132 (5th
Cir. 1978); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1322 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
VII/DT/Inc: Caravantes v. California State Univ., 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984); Perham
v. Ladd, 436 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. 11. 1977); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 431 F. Supp.
152 (D. Mass. 1975); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 339 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y.
1975).
VII/T/+: Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
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1969. Parallelling the pattern of the study mentioned above,75 the defen-
dant-institution prevailed in an estimated sixty-eight percent of the con-
clusive cases, with a slightly less favorable ratio for the first amendment
decisions. This latter area accounted for over three-quarters of the cases.
Across legal bases, D/T and its immediately neighboring levels accounted
for most of the cases, due to the greater stake of plaintiffs' interest. Spe-
cifically with regard to D/T, the plaintiff-faculty member was successful
in only three (22%) of fourteen conclusive decisions. Success for the de-
fendant institutions in this area may be partially attributable to the
courts' general reluctance to award relief in the form of granting tenure.
6
In two of the D/T cases where the plaintiff-faculty member was victori-
ous, the appellate courts did not have to decide the issue as a result of the
death of the plaintiff in one case 77 and the acquisition of employment
elsewhere in the other."
Another way to summarize the relevant case law is to describe the char-
acteristic behaviors of the faculty-plaintiffs that illustrate what is meant
by collegiality. Support for teacher organizations,"6 Marxist philosophy,8"
or other "non-Establishment" causes"1 is often associated with a disfa-
vored, or uncollegial, personality. Personality problems, however, are not
limited to visible affiliation or activism. In fact, a common locus of per-
sonality disputes is the department in which the faculty member is active,
the clash focusing on colleagues 2 or, more frequently, the chairperson."3
VII/T/-: Jawa v. Fayetville State Univ., 426 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
0/$/-: Adams v. Lake City Community College, 404 So.2d 148 (Fla. App. 1981)(state law).
O/DT/-: Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1981)(procedural due process).
O/T/-: Kelly v. Kansas City, 648 P.2d 225 (Kan. 1982)(procedural due process plus state
law).
" See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text.
76 For the major case in which such relief was debated and provided, see Kunda v. Muh-
lenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
" United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1982).
" Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
" See e.g., Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1084 (5th Cir. 1976)(teacher oppo-
sition to annual evaluation); Ofsevit v. Trustees, 21 Cal. 3d 763, -, 582 P.2d 88, 89, 148
Cal. Rptr. 1, -, (1978)(active participation in local teachers' union).
10 See, e-g., Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D. Ark. 1979)(professor was entitled
to reinstatement because his communist beliefs were a substantial and motivating factor in
his non-reappointment); Carr v. Board of Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 886, 894 (N.D. Ohio
1979)(communist- oriented writings and textbook selection were alleged to be motivating
factors in tenure denial).
81 See, e.g., Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (D. Del.
1977)(faculty advisor for gay student group); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F.
Supp. 1264, 1269 (M.D. Pa. 1976)(professor organized and participated in campus protests
against racism and the Vietnam War).
" See, e.g., Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3, 6 (S.D. Miss. 1977)(alleged
race, religion and national origin discrimination and retaliation for filing EEOC complaint),
aff'd mer., 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Watts v. Board of Curators, 495 F.2d 384, 386
(8th Cir. 1974)(professor nonrenewal partly because of refusal to take on teaching assign-
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Deans and presidents of the college or university also constitute focal
points of personality clashes.8 4 The subject matter of the disputes varies
widely and includes curricular policies, 85 student interactions,8 6 adminis-
trative rules,"7 and use of university funds."8 Common catch-alls or
charges for the targeted kinds of conduct are: "clashes of personality,"8' 9
"lack .. .[of] 'sense of camaraderie,'"90 "troublemaker,"91 "anti-admin-
istrative attitude," '92 "inability ...to maintain harmony," '9 3 and "unco-
operative attitude." '94 Moreover, female faculty members who are consid-
ments and failure to cooperate with colleagues and administration).
11 See, e.g., Roseman v. Indiana Univ., 520 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d Cir. 1975)(controversy
between professor and chairman over chairman's handling of a teaching application), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 549 (5th
Cir.) (head of department contended that teacher failed to follow established university req-
uisition procedures), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
8, See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.
1982)(nonrenewal by university president because of professor's allegation of misuse of re-
search funds); Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1976) (university
president wrote letters threatening action if professors continued to publicly criticize univer-
sity policy), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981).
85 See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 662 F.2d 439, 440 (6th Cir. 1981)(teacher
criticized social science curriculum including its standardized examinations), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 910 (1982); Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1108
(7th Cir. 1977)(faculty member wrote interdepartmental memoranda which were hostile to
department's planned courses).
81 See, e.g., Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1982)(professor marred stu-
dent and developed rift with administration); Texton v. Hancock, 359 So.2d 895, 896 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(students complained of professor's immoral and unprofessional
conduct).
8' See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 124 (5th Cir. 1980)(failure to
follow university's personal phone call and notification rules); Cussler v. University of Mary-
land, 430 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Md. 1977)(university allegedly did not consider its own
promotion and assignment criteria).
8" See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.
1982)(misuse of research funds alleged by professor); D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469, 471
(5th Cir. 1980)(alleged retaliation for professor's public statements concerning university
finances), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
89 See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1349 (W.D. Pa.
1977)(medical school faculty member "clashed" with allegedly sexist colleagues).
"0 See, e.g., Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1973)(allegations of inappro-
priate class discussions and faculty friction), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
9, See, e.g., Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, , 339
N.E.2d 880, 883, 337 N.Y.S.2d 471 , - (1975)(failure to obtain promotion purportedly due
to "troublesome" behavior and not sex discrimination).
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 336 (10th Cir. 1973)(professor had discussed
improper use of funds by the school administration with his students), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 908 (1977).
" See, e.g., Kelly v. Kansas City, 231 Kan. 751, -, 648 P.2d 225, 229 (1982)(faculty
members in nursing program failed to cooperate in their scheduling of tests and provision-
ing of materials).
88 See, e.g., Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1982)(problems stemming
from professor's association with students).
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ered to be demurely "old fashioned" or modishly "assertive" are
particularly susceptible to charges that their personality interfered with
their job performance."
The descriptions of these types of conduct tend to be somewhat vague
and, thus, amorphous. The overlap with overt criteria, such as service,
and the tendency for personality problems to commence or compound af-
ter an initial adverse employment action, thus escalating hostilities in
moving across the above-mentioned continuum,9" further contributes to
the inevitably imprecise contours of these cases. Nevertheless, the fact
exists that a substantial number of cases well within these confines have
been litigated and the substantial weight of judicial resolution has been
rendered against the faculty-plaintiffs, as is particularly notable in D/T
cases.
IV. ALTERNATE APPROACH FOR REVIEWING COURTS
The customary judicial approach in faculty-employment cases gener-
ally,97 and faculty-tenure cases specifically, 8 is academic abstention, a
doctrine deeply rooted in the tradition of institutional autonomy." The
purpose of this tradition is to provide protection for the "free and full
exchange of ideas" 00 in their unique milieu, colleges and universities. As
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cogently stated: "[Olur universities
must serve as great bazaars of ideas where the heavy hand of regulation
has little place. Like other bazaars, they may seem rude, cacophonous,
even distasteful at times; but they are necessary predicates to the more
11 See, e.g-, Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 110-12 (1st Cir. 1978) cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (promotion committee has characterized same applicant as
"rigid, narrow-minded, and inflexible"); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 860
(D. Vt. 1976)(department chairman described a female teacher seeking reappointment as "a
little too assertive in manner").
'6 See, e.g., Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 647 (9th Cir. 1982) dispute over allocation of
funds received for the college's professional medical services); Poddar v. Youngstown State
Univ., 480 F.2d 192, 193 (6th Cir. 1973)(continuing dispute over university promotion
practices).
See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). The court stated:
Of all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over,
education and faculty appointments at a university level are probably the least
suited for federal court supervision.
Id. at 1231-32.
" See, e.g., Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (M.D. Pa.
1976)("The courts will not serve as a Super-Tenure Review Committee").
9 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The rationale often given by these
courts is the subjectivity and difficulty of such decisions, however, judicial expertise has
been applied to comparably complex and subjective decision-making in other contexts, such
as the employment of professionals and managers in private industry and in government.
"' Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 111 L.R.R.M. 3156, 3171-72
(D. Minn. 1982), aff'd, - U.S. - (1984). See also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
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orderly market of ideas in our public life."''
Recently, several courts have carved out limited exceptions to this
"hands off" policy in Title VII discrimination cases.10 This judicial atti-
tude, although intuitively moving in the right direction, is not directly
applicable nor particularly principled with regard to faculty-tenure cases
that rest, at least in part, on personality factors. Rather, an approach that
pierces the veil of institutional autonomy when there is a threat to indi-
vidual autonomy is necessary. The college or university abdicates its pro-
tection from judicial interference with the robust exchange of ideas when
it interferes with this same free flow of views. Such interference is evident
where the institution, via the employment actions of its administrators or
faculty members, discriminates against or otherwise infringes upon the
expression of professional personalities. As the Third Circuit recently
stated:
The academic process entails, at its core, open communication
[which leads] to reasoned decisions. Our society assumes, in al-
most all cases with good reason, that different views with the aca-
demic community will be tested in an atmosphere of free debate.
It is the dialectic process which underlies learning and progress.1
0 3
As the Fifth Circuit added in In Re Dinnan:l °" "Ideas may be suppressed
just as effectively by denying tenure as by prohibiting the teaching of
courses."' 0 5
This Article's thesis does not dictate judicial resolution in favor of
faculty-plaintiffs in collegiality and other personality related D/T cases.
Rather, this thesis merely advocates removal of the special protection
conferred upon institutions of higher education when its justification has
"I Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1981)(citing Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
10' See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980); Jepsen v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726,
731 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 984 (1978); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 (1st Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). But see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
The legislative history of Title VII includes a marketplace-of-ideas rationale for its
amended application to academic institutions:
The committee can not imagine a more sensitive area than educational institu-
tions where the Nation's youth are exposed to a multitude of ideas that will
strongly influence their future development. To permit discrimination here would,
more than in any other area, tend to promote misconceptions leading to future
patterns of discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1972)(emphasis added).
"' Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 986 (1981); see also Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980);
Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1976).
104 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
1"I Id. at 430.
[Vol. 33:223
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/4
FACULTY TENURE
been lost. In these cases, the faculty-plaintiffs are left in the position of
other employers covered by the first amendment or Title VII who must
clearly legitimate their employment actions when and if the burden is
placed upon them. Further, it ought to be understood that, under this
approach, institutions of higher education retain those contextual pecu-
liarities that are relevant to an evaluation of their own actions, such as
the dual authority system for academic governance"' 8 and the peer review
process for the awarding of tenure." 7
For public institutions of higher education and others shown to have
the requisite "state action '10 to be covered by the first amendment, the
Pickering-Mt.Healthy test' would be applied without any special defer-
ence to the defendant institutions, and with special reference to their
marketplace-of-ideas mission. Specifically, the use of this approach at
Step One1 would emphasize the special breadth of plaintiff's conduct
protected by the first amendment, and its use at Step Two"' would re-
quire the specific sufficiency of defendant's "but for" decision.' For
public and private institutions of higher education covered by Title
VII,"1 the McDonnell Douglas - Furnco test"4 would be similarly applied
when a personality basis is shown and Step One is fulfilled so that special
emphasis is given to the sufficiency and specificity of the defendant-insti-
tution's Step Two proof of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dis-
missal. Inasmuch as academic freedom is not an absolute right and
must be balanced against other important interests," ' covered institu-
tions of higher education could rely on insubordination or incompetency
as a valid reason for adverse employment action. Insubordination, typi-
cally testable in nonrenewal or termination cases involving personality
"I' See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980); see also Zirkel & Pease, Beyond
Yeshiva: The Case for a Coordinated Approach to Faculty Bargaining, 11 STETSON L. REV.
51, 76 (1981).
101 See Gray, supra note 67.
108 Courts have generally been reluctant to find state action for private institutions. See,
eg., H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 50, at 579; cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982).
10 See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying note 24.
... See supra text accompanying note 25.
.. In a recent decision in the analogous area of mixed-motive discharge under the NLRA,
the Supreme Court referred to Mt, Healthy as authority for shifting the burden of persua-
sion, not just production, at Step 2. See NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983).
"' Title VII does not apply to institutions with less than 15 employees or to those that
are religiously affiliated. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b) and 2000e-1 (1968).
"' See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
... Such cases, however, involved shifting the burden of production, not persuasion. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
I"5 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982); Stastny v. Board of
Trustees, 647 F.2d 496, 502-03 (Wash. App. 1982).
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factors, should require proof of substantial and material disruption of the
faculty member's classroom performance or the defendant institution's
operation. 1 7 Further, the Pickering exception for "the kind of close work-
ing relationships for which it can be persuasively claimed that personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their [sic] proper functioning"11 s
should not be applied broadly in the context of higher education since, as
Justice Brennan subsequently pointed out, "undivided loyalty to manage-
ment is antithetical to the whole concept of academic freedom.""' Within
these narrow confines, uncollegial personality is a justifiable basis for de-
nial of tenure or other similar employment action.
Incompetence, often relevant to termination or D/T cases involving
personality factors, similarly should require specific proof at Step Two by
the institution of insufficient teaching, scholarship, or service. Institu-
tions should assiduously avoid the use of collegiality and other personal-
ity factors unless they are legitimately part of these performance criteria.
Moreover, courts should not be awed by the seemingly esoteric expertise
required to evaluate these factors. For example, colleges and universities
do not typically rely on direct and empirical evidence, such as classroom
visitation or videotaping and student achievement, to evaluate teach-
ing. 120 Similarly, the evaluated scope of service ranges widely across cam-
pus, community, and professional activities"' and scholarship assumes an
ascertainable hierarchy with the highest weight to refereed journals. 2'
Further, the review process typically extends beyond the expertise of the
candidate's department to college-wide or university-wide faculty com-
mittees. 123 Thus, the process gravitates towards reliance on the evalua-
tions of relatively few specialists either within or outside of the candi-
date's institution. Judges and juries do not stand, in fact, so far from the
rest of the candidate's colleagues and their academic administrators". in
the reviewing process, as listeners or readers of these specialists' opinions
with regard to the candidates' performance in teaching, scholarship, and
service. These secondary reviewers have no monopoly on the ability to
read and interpret such summary sources of data, and they should be
" See Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
986 (1981)(citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 563, 508
(1969)).
's Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S, 563, 570 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983). See supra note 28.
119 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 700 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
," See J. CENTRA, supra note 16, at 9.
Id. at 6.
... See Suppa & Zirkel, The Importance of Refereed Publications: A National Survey, 64
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 739 (1983).
"I See Zirkel, Faculty Review in its Promotion and Tenure Process Beyond the Depart-
mental Level, J. GEN. Enuc. (in press).
"I See N. WHITMAN & E. WEiss, FACULTY EVALUATION: THE USE OF EXPLICIT CRITERIA FOR
PROMOTION, RETENTION AND TENURE 23 (1982).
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held accountable at Step Two to articulate to judges and juries any spe-
cialized knowledge that they may have employed. Similarly, they ought to
be prepared to explain the legitimacy of any personality evidence used to
evaluate these criteria if the plaintiff faculty member makes out a Step
One case; such evidence is surely not beyond the ken of most judges and
juries.
Where an institution adopts a separate collegiality/personality crite-
rion, it should be defined clearly and interpreted narrowly so as not to
impede the robust exchange of ideas. This explicit arrangement offers the
advantage of fair warning and the opportunity for shared formulation; the
danger, however, of being stretched or manipulated to stifle dissent and
discourage debate would seem to outweigh its advantages. Reviewing
courts should be vigilant in keeping such criteria within the narrow
boundaries of their supporting policy and evidence.
An "almost paradoxical" argument is that emphasizing one school of
thought in a department might contribute to the "robustness" of the de-
bate within the larger community of colleges and universities."' Although
there is some merit in the notion of such specialization, the potential for
abuse should warn against overestimating the weight of this theory. Fur-
ther, it is only applicable to the limited number of personality cases based
on a particular academic viewpoint. 2 " At least for the public and nonreli-
gious institutions covered by the first amendment and Title VII, courts
should avoid deferential acceptance of this one-school argument, putting
the clear Step Two burden on the institution to provide justification
when personality evidence is at issue. Thus, a particular theoretical per-
spective for faculty members might be justifiable for certain advanced
courses or research projects, but its use to limit discussion or debate in
other campus forums is highly suspect.
The long-term consequence of an award of tenure should not deter
judges from utilizing the proposed approach in D/T cases involving per-
sonality factors. Depending on the circumstances, the court may fashion
less drastic relief, such as monetary damages or a special judicially-im-
posed extension of the probationary period. Further, if the candidate is
qualified for tenure, granting such complete relief would merely be pro-
viding what he deserved and what the institution would have done but
for its unwarranted infringement.'27 Finally, the institution would still
have the safeguard of termination proceedings if the candidate's perform-
ance constituted incompetence, insubordination, or other personal cause.
The next logical step would be to extend this approach to institutions
that are not covered by the first amendment and to conduct that is not
.. Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 879, 885 (1979).
'2 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117 Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 549 (3d Cir. 1980).
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covered by Title VII. Several courts have attempted to creatively import
constitutional protections based on common law 2 s or state action 2 ' into
the sphere of private institutions of higher education and similar organi-
zational entities. A more readily available basis for extending such an ap-
proach to private institutions of higher education, and reinforcing it in
public institutions, is through both contract and tort actions based on the
employment contract; this includes institutional polices and particularly,
but not exclusively, in collective bargaining contexts past practices.'
Such claims in faculty-employment cases to date have been largely incon-
clusive' 3' or, citing the academic abstention doctrine, unsuccessful. 13'
Nevertheless, under the approach advocated in this Article, without the
unwarranted protection of academic abstention, such claims may be more
promising.
Regardless of its extension beyond the coverage of the first amendment
and Title VII, the approach within the scope of coverage for faculty-em-
ployment cases should balance the requirement for specificity of plain-
tiffs Step One claims' 3' with a requirement for careful scrutiny of defen-
dant's Step Two reasons. Perhaps, as serveral commentators contend,1
4
the blindspot lies in the eyes of some judges; while juries generally seem
able to see through superficial defenses of colleges and universities, their
decisions are sometimes subsequently overturned by deferential judges."'
In any event, such an approach would provide a better balance between
118 See, e.g., Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418
(1977)(surgical resident in a private teaching hospital is entitled to common law right of fair
procedure prior to dismissal; cf. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 1816 (1980).
"I See Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 965 (3d Cir. 1977).
'30 See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)(citing United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960)).
" See Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.
1979).
'32 See Marwil v. Baker, 419 F. Supp. 560, 576 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Carr v. Board of Trust-
ees, 465 F. Supp. 886, 904 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
Further, these claims have been largely limited to public college and university settings
making their usefulness somewhat superfluous. See, e.g., Endress v. Brookdale Community
College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, -, 364 A.2d 1080, 1102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
"I See Dewey v. University of New Hampshire 694 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2121 (1983); Black v. Brown Univ. 555 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1983).
"4 See Yurko, supra note 16, at 491; Note, supra note 36, at 1213 and n.40.
" See, e.g. Peacock v. Board of Regents, 597 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd and re-
manded, 694 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1982)(affirming the overturning of a jury verdict for
$470,000 on a first amendment count in a faculty demotion/suspension case); Hildebrand v.
Board of Trustees, 662 F.2d 439 (6th Cir, 1981) (upholding district court's judgment not-
withstanding the verdict for faculty-plaintiff in a D/T case), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910
(1982); Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's reversal of
jury verdict of $81,885 in a D/T first amendment case), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 69 (1982);
Scagnelli v. Whiting, 554 F. Supp. 77 (M.D.N.C. 1982)(setting aside a jury verdict of
$500,000 on a first amendment claim in D/T case).
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the interests of the individual and the institution, with an appropriate
emphasis on their ultimate and mutual interest in the robust exchange of
ideas. Such an approach also extends an emerging trend among both
courts 3 ' and commentators' 37 toward a more balanced position in the
limited and related area of Title VII litigation to squarely and specifically
address faculty employment cases involving collegiality or other personal-
ity factors.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article advocates an approach under which courts would not pro-
vide colleges and universities with the insulation of academic abstention
where the institution commits an infringement upon an individual faculty
member's academic freedom. In such instances, the threat is propagated
from within the institution rather than from without. In the collective
sense of the institution, "the enemy it is us.""'  Thus, in Mayberry v.
Dees,'39 the court incorrectly resorted to academic abstention and not
fully applying the Mr. Healthy test.'" More specifically, the Mayberry
court viewed the scope of the plaintiff's protected conduct and the legiti-
macy of the institution's reasons for dismissal as if the analogy to the
business world were complete,' 4 ' and as if the Keast Commission had rec-
ommended the use of collegiality as a criterion. 4 ' Rather, the court
should have protected Mayberry's academic freedom, narrowly construed
the collegiality criterion, and strictly scrutinized the evidence regarding
his qualifications for tenure. Whatever the result, this reasoning would be
more in line with the tradition and mission of higher education.
[The university] campus [is] a forum whose chief and high pur-
pose is the robust exchange of ideas . . . . But academic freedom
" See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Gray v. Board of Higher Educ.,
692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
Ms See, e.g., Gray, supra note 67, at 29 (supporting Second Circuit's balancing approach
for confidentiality of tenure committee votes and deliberations in Title VII cases); Roukis,
Halpern & Zeichner, Sex-Based Discrimination in Higher Education, 34 LAB. L. J. 229, 236
(1983)(recommending explicitly weighted criteria and public proceedings in Title VII tenure
cases); Yurko, supra note 16, at 506, 536 (proposing qualified deference based on intermedi-
ate organization theory for Title VII cases, including minimal deference where collegiality is
at issue); Note, supra note 36, at 1229 (advocating the extension of Title VII disparate
treatment analysis to require demonstration at Step 1 that university's autonomy interest is
insignificant); Note, supra note 49, at 1567 (recommending qualified privilege for tenure
determinations in civil rights cases).
138 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
" 663 F.2d at 502; see supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
"0 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
,'4 See 663 F.2d at 507 n.16. Even the majority in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672
(1980), recognized that the analogy to industry is incomplete. Id. at 689; see also EEOC v.
Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 157 (D. Mass, 1975).
"' See supra note 9.
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is illusory when it does not protect faculty from censurious prac-
tices but rather serves as a veil for those who might act as
censors. 143
"1 692 F.2d at 909.
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